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3Is Poverty a Binding Constraint on Growth 
in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Jean-Yves Duclos and Stephen A. O'Connell
1 Introduction
The literature on pro-poor growth studies the links from national growth 
strategies and patterns to poverty outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is 
to look at the other direction of the nexus: the links from poverty to growth.
By poverty we mean a state in which household consumption is below some 
absolute purchasing power standard. Figure 3.1 uses survey data from the World 
Bank's PovcalNet online database to compare the prevalence of consumption 
poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 2011 with that of other developing regions. ^ 
Africa is by far the poorest region in the world. If there are links from poverty to 
growth in the development process, then certainly Africa is the main place to worry 
about them and accommodate them in the formation of growth strategies.
Our central argument is that the most promising directions for country- 
based research on the links from poverty to growth involve microeconomic 
investigations of the effects of poverty on productivity. The bulk of the 
chapter is devoted to reviewing the dominant mechanisms through which 
these effects may emerge, both from a macro and from a micro perspective.
2 Development Traps: Framing the Issues
At the economy-wide level, a link from poverty to growth is a link from the 
level of income per capita, y, to the growth rate of income per capita, g. In
' <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?0>, last accessed 11 May 2015.
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Figure 3.1. Poverty headcount ratios: percentage of population below $1.25 of con­
sumption per day in 2011 (at 2005 PPP), by region
Notes: Headcounts are defined as the percentage of the population with consumption below $1.25 
pet day (at 2005 PPP).
The boxes enclose the central half of the distribution of headcounts for each region; the 
horizontal line within the box is at the regional median. The 'whiskers' extend to the maximum 
and minimum values for the region, excluding outliers which ate shown as dots.
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; LAC = Latin America and Caribbean; SASl = South Asia; EAP = East Asia 
and Pacific; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; ECA: Europe and Central Asia. Industrial 
economies ate excluded.
PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: World Bank, PovcalNet online database.
functional notation, g = f (y, z), where z is a vector of underlying growth 
determinants or fundamentals. The Solow (1956) growth model provides a 
familiar example and we use it here as a point of departure.
2.1 A growth-theory perspective
Figure 3.2 shows a neoclassical production function y = A k°' where k is the 
capital stock per worker, >1 > 0 is the level of total factor productivity (TFP), 
which we treat here as a constant, and a e (0,1) is the share of capital in 
national income. For given rates of saving, depreciation, and population growth 
(s, S, and n), the capital stock per worker is stationary when saving is just 
sufficient to keep the capital stock per worker from falling—or, equivalently, 
when output per worker is a multiple (n + 8)/s of the capital stock per worker.
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Figure 3.2. The Solow model
Note: The dotted line is the per-worker production function y = A-k^, for 71 = 3 and a = 0.4. The 
straight line is [(n+8)/s]-k, for n = 0.03, S = 0.04 and s = 0.20. The steady state occurs where these two 
loci cross or, equivalently, where total saving s-y equals the amount of investment required to keep 
the capital stock pet worker from falling, (n+8)-k. To the left (right) of this intersection, the capital 
stock per worker is rising (falling).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Steady states therefore occur at all intersections of A • with [(n + S)/s] • k. Given 
diminishing returns to capital, there is only one such intersection with 
a positive capital stock. At this steady state, the value of income per worker, 
y* = [A-s/(n + 8)]“^^““, is a continuous function of the vector of fundamentals 
z = [A, s, «, 8, a].
The phase diagram for the Solow model shows a monotonically decreasing 
relationship between growth and income, holding z constant (Figure 3.3). 
This configuration implies that, for a given set of fundamentals, the poorer a 
country is, the faster it grows. This property, known as conditional convergence, 
is widely viewed as the central implication of the neoclassical growth model 
(Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992). A stronger yetsion—absolute convergence— 
applies if cross-country differences in the fundamentals are small; in this case 
all countries approach the same steady state, and along the transition path 
the proportional difference between any two incomes shrinks over time. 
These convergence properties continue to hold if TFP grows at an exogenous 
rate common across all countries; in this case economies approach a steady- 
state growth path rather than a constant income level.
The Solow model therefore offers a simple account of the link between 
income and growth: holding the fundamentals constant, poor countries 
grow faster than rich ones, because low income indicates a scarcity of capital 
and therefore a high return on investment. The force of this link is greater if 
international capital mobility is stronger, but it holds even in a financially 
closed global economy.
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Figure 3.3. Phase diagram for the Solow model
Source: Authors' calculations, based on the Solow model in Figure 3.2.
As Pritchett (2004) puts it, absolute convergence fails 'big time', both over 
centuries and in data from the post-WWII period. Quah (1993; 1996; 2001) 
and others study the empirical distribution of cross-country incomes per 
capita after 1960 and argue that the way in which absolute convergence fails 
is not random. By contrast with a situation in which some countries are 
endowed with low-income fundamentals, others with medium-income, and 
others with high-income, the empirical distribution shows a tendency to 
develop twin peaks over time. Two convergence clubs can be distinguished, 
one of which has gone through a largely irreversible historical process of 
industrialization and development and the other of which—comprising the 
UN's least-developed countries. Collier's (2007) bottom billion, or larger 
groups below some development threshold—has not. The lagging growth 
performance of sub-Saharan Africa has played a major role in global diver­
gence since 1960, and most of the continent continues to fall within the low- 
development group (Berthelemy, 2007; Ndulu and O'Connell, 2007; Sachs 
et al., 2004).
Not surprisingly, the Solow model does considerably better empirically once 
the fundamentals are allowed to differ across countries. The standard 
approach in the growth literature is to estimate a linearized version of ^ = 
fly; z) using cross-country panel data. When this is done, the parameter that 
captures dfjdy is robustly negative and statistically significant (Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil, 1992; Hoeffler, 2002). Barro (1991), Sachs and Warner 
(1997), and others go further, retaining the conditional convergence term 
but implicitly modeling the Solow fundamentals as functions of deeper
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determinants. In this approach, z = z(w), where w may include policy vari­
ables, geographical determinants of productivity, or institutional aspects of 
the investment environment; the growth equation becomes g = fiy;w).
Within the growth literature, the leading theoretical alternative to the 
neoclassical approach is the endogenous growth tradition initiated by 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). This approach models the productivity term 
in as a stock that can be accumulated through purposive investment 
activity—in human capital for example, or research and development. Since 
knowledge is a public good, this process is subject to positive externalities 
that scale up the productivity impact of any individual's investment. In 
the simplest 'AK' versions of endogenous growth theory, the aggregate pro­
duction function becomes y = A-k, where k is a broad concept of reproducible 
capital and A is a constant (the average product of broad capital) that 
can differ across countries. These economies display constant returns to 
broad capital and therefore have no steady-state level of income. The condi­
tional convergence term is absent in the growth equation, which now 
becomes g = f[z) ox g = f{w).
2.2 Development traps
The twin peaks phenomenon identifies a set of countries that remained poor 
after 1960. But did these countries fail to grow because they were poor? Equiva­
lently: is low income self-perpetuating at the national level? So far our answer 
is no. Within the neoclassical and AK traditions, persistently low income is 
driven by weak fundamentals and not by low income per se. Low income may 
be persistent but it is not self-perpetuating, unless the fundamentals them­
selves are functions of income.
If z = z(y; w) or w = w(y), then of course things are more complicated. 
Holding constant any fundamentals that do not depend on income (call 
these x), we now have g = fty; x), where the impact of income includes any 
indirect effect operating through the fundamentals. The net impact of income 
on growth, df/dy, can now easily be non-monotonic. Figure 3.4 shows an 
example studied by Solow (1956) himself, in which TFP follows a logistic 
curve, rising smoothly from A = ltoA = 3asa country traverses a middle 
range of capital stocks per worker. Here A =A{k) or, implicitly, A = A(y).^ The 
phase diagram is now non-monotonic (see Figure 3.5), implying that poor 
countries may grow more slowly than otherwise identical rich countries.
^ Here y=A-k'‘, sok = k{A,y). Substituting A = A(fc) yieids the implicit function A(y). In Figures 3.4 
and 3.5, we use a = 0.4 and>l = 1 + [2/(1 + exp(a-/;)], A = l + [2/(1 -H exp (a - it))] with « = IS for the 
multiple equilibrium case and a = 8 for the persistence case.
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Figure 3.4. Variable productivity models
Notes: The upper and lower concave production functions take the form y = A-hP *, with A = 1 and 
.4 = 3. The production functions drawn with heavy solid or dashed lines use A = 1 + [2/(1 + exp(a-it)], 
with a = 15 for the multiple equilibrium (solid) case and a = 8 for the persistence (dashed) case.
If df/dy is sufficiently non-monotonic, the growth equation fly; x) crosses 
the horizontal axis more than once. Crossings with df/dy > 0 define thresholds 
below which income falls and above which it rises, while crossings with 
df/dy < 0 are locally stable steady states.
The development economics literature is full of theoretical models in 
which the aggregate economy has two locally stable steady states. Recent 
overviews include Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) and Azariadis and Stachurski 
(2005); Sachs et al. (2004) develop three examples in the context of sub- 
Saharan Africa. While the lower of these two equilibria is commonly called a 
poverty trap, the reference to poverty is potentially misleading. Income is lower 
in the bad equilibrium than in the good equilibrium, but the relationship of 
the low-income equilibrium to any absolute income standard is unclear. 
Moreover, if productivity grows at a common global rate it is the cross-country 
ratios of income, not the levels, that approach a steady state. We therefore 
follow Berthelemy (2007) in referring to these low-income equilibria as devel­
opment traps.
There are good reasons, moreover, to discount the tendency of theoretical 
treatments to focus on multiplicity per se. In terms of policy significance, 
there is little distinction between a world in which low income is one of a 
number of long-term equilibria and one in which low income is associated 
with very slow growth. In either case a large enough temporary boost to the 
capital stock can produce a long-lasting improvement in the growth path, in 
sharp contrast with the decline in growth that would occur in a conditional 
convergence world with fixed fundamentals. Observationally too, the two
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cases may be equivalent or nearly so: in both cases low income can persist over 
a long period and twin peaks can emerge in the cross-sectional distribution of 
national incomes (Kremer, Onatski, and Stock, 2001). In our view, therefore, 
multiplicity is too strong a criterion for thinking about links from income to 
growth. In what follows, we define a development trap as any situation in which 
low average income holds back aggregate economic growth for an extended 
period (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005; Quah, 2001).
2.3 Productivity and accumuiation
The traps in Figure 3.5, whether they constitute distinct low-income equilibria 
or not, are driven by a phase of sharply increasing returns to aggregate invest­
ment. Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) associate this phase with diffuse exter­
nalities to household- and firm-level investments in human capital or 
industrial technology. Other mechanisms may of course be relevant as well, 
since at this high level of aggregation A comprises any influence on the 
relationship between output per worker and the concave function of
convergence - - - persistence --------- multiplicity
Figure 3.5. Phase diagrams for variable productivity models
Notes: The phase diagrams correspond to the uppermost concave production function in Figure 3.4 
(A = 3) and to the two production functions with convex portions.
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physical capital per worker.^ We discuss a variety of potential mechanisms 
throughout this chapter.
Early trap models, however, often focused on capital accumulation rather 
than on productivity (references appear in Sachs et al., 2004). A subsistence 
floor for consumption, for example, can generate a positive correlation 
between saving rates and income, so that the [{n + S)/s]-k locus becomes 
strictly convex over some range. Theories of the demographic transition can 
have a similar effect, by generating a negative correlation between fertility 
rates and income (perhaps indirectly, through the impact of education and 
labour-market opportunities on female labour force participation). If these 
effects are strong enough, the phase diagram can become non-monotonic 
even if the production function itself displays diminishing returns. Low 
income can then persist over long periods and, as in the A(k) case, this 
possibility is present even if the long-term equilibrium is unique and identical 
across countries.
While saving and fertility-based traps may have some relevance for sub- 
Saharan Africa, the global growth evidence is more decisive on the importance 
of persistent differences in productivity. Figure 3.6 illustrates this point using a 
celebrated argument from Lucas (1990). Using data from 1990, Lucas pointed 
out that if the USA and India occupied the same diminishing-returns produc­
tion function, the roughly 11:1 ratio of observed real GDPs per capita would 
require a ratio of physical capital per worker of about 400:1 (= 11 where a is
the share of capital in GDP, assumed to be 0.4). The actual ratio was an order of 
magnitude lower, at less than 20:1. Moreover, if the ratio of capital stocks per 
worker were really 400:1, the marginal return to capital would be 400^““ ^ 36 
times larger in India than in the USA. No conceivable tax differential or 
difference in country risk could then prevent capital from flowing from New 
York to Delhi. But the reverse was tme: capital flowed from Delhi to New York. 
There was no way, Lucas argued, that the USA and India could occupy the 
same neoclassical production function. If the USA was at a point like 2 in 
Figure 3.6, India had to be at a point like 4, on a different and strictly inferior 
production function.
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) responded to Lucas by introducing 
human capital as a third factor of production. They specify a neoclassical 
production function of the form Y — A FC“H^L^““~^ where H is the stock of 
human capital and a -i- /3 < 1 implies diminishing returns to broad capital. 
When squeezed into the form y = AFC“, this function can generate
^ One of the most obvious—^which we will not pursue here—is that physical or human capital 
may be systematically overestimated in poor countries. Prichett (2000) and Hsleh and Klenow 
(2007) argue that this is the case for physical capital, and Manuelll and Seshadri (2007) argue that it 
is the case for human capital.
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Figure 3.6. The growth facts imply large productivity differences: USA-India example 
Notes: The tangents at points 2, 3, and 4 show the marginal product of capital.
cross-country differences in measured total factor productivity, A, even if 
actual TFP, A, is the same across countries: A = A-h^, where h is human capital 
per worker. Low levels of human capital can then help explain the coexistence 
of low incomes with low marginal returns to investment.
Incorporating human capital goes some way towards resolving Lucas's 
puzzle, but country income differences remain too large to be accounted for 
by differences even in broad (physical plus human) capital per worker, in the 
absence of some phase of strongly increasing returns."* Hall and Jones (1999) 
document this point in detail, showing that TFP differences account for 
the bulk of international differences in income even after controlling for 
measured human capital. A similar point emerges in conventional growth­
accounting exercises. Comparing growth in Africa with growth in other 
developing regions, Ndulu and O'Connell (2007) find that differences in 
conventionally measured physical and human capital per worker account 
for only about half of Africa's shortfall between 1960 and 2000.
Income-dependent saving and fertility behaviours are therefore unlikely, on 
their own, to explain Africa's failure to industrialize. The reason is that these 
mechanisms work through capital scarcity, and in a world of diminishing 
returns this means high returns to investment, not low returns. Irrevocably 
hostile fundamentals can, of course, explain a confluence of low income and 
low returns to investment (as in a conventional conditional convergence 
world), but in such cases poverty is an effect rather than a cause of slow
* Lucas estimated a 5:1 ratio of human capital per worker and showed that an 11:1 ratio of 
incomes then implied a ratio of capital stocks pet worker of Just over 70:1 (USA:India) and a ratio of 
marginal products of capital of about 13:1 (India:USA). These are still fat too large; see Banerjee and 
Duflo (2005) for further discussion.
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growth. If development traps are empirically important, therefore, other 
mechanisms must be at work to keep the productivity of capital low when 
income itself is low.
2.4 Poverty in the binding constraints approach
We point out in what follows that the theory of development traps is well 
ahead of empirical evidence. For that reason it is also well ahead of policy, at 
least in the area of growth strategy where traps suggest potentially large pay­
offs to policy intervention but the literature provides little guidance on where 
and how to intervene.^ To develop this point we briefly consider the role of 
poverty in the binding constraints framework of Hausmann, Velasco, and 
kodrik (2005).
Hausmann, Velasco, and Rodrik (2005) motivate a flexible and country- 
focused approach to growth-oriented policy reform by appealing to a variant 
of our one-sector growth equation g = f{z). In their framework the steady-state 
growth of output per worker is given by ^ = ct[(1 - t) r - p], where a is the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption in successive 
periods; r = r(a, 6, &) is the social rate of return on capital; t is the tax rate on 
capital (so that (1 - r)-r is the private return on capital); and p is the interest 
rate at which the country's residents can borrow in world markets. The social 
rate of return depends on firm-level TFP, given in their notation by a, on an 
index d of the externalities to private investment, and on an indicator & of the 
availability of complementary factors of production, including public infra­
structure capital or human capital. The tax rate t is to be interpreted broadly; it 
can refer to either actual or expected taxes and to formal or informal levies on 
private returns.
Hausmann et al. (2005) develop a diagnostic algorithm of sorts by translat­
ing their growth equation into a hierarchical analysis of potential growth 
constraints (see Table 3.1). Rodrik (2007) describes the growth diagnostics 
approach as follows:
These two equations [for g and r] summarize the possible factors that can affect 
growth performance. An exercise of growth diagnostics simply consists of reviewing 
and analyzing these factors to ascertain which of these factors is the most binding 
constraint on growth. As the analysis above reveals, all factors (including market 
distortions and policy wedges) are likely to matter for growth and welfare. The 
challenge is to identify the one that provides the largest positive direct effect, so
* 'The new literature on poverty traps has yet to focus on issues of policy design.' (Bowles, 
Dutlauf, and Hoff, 2006, p. 11).
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Table 3.1. Growth diagnostics a la Hausmann et al. (2005)
Low return to Low social returns Poor geography
economic activity Low human capital
Bad infrastructure
Low appropriability Government Micro risks: property rights,
failures corruption, taxes
Macro risks: financial, 
monetary, fiscal instability 
Market failures Information externalities:
'self-discovery'
Coordination externalities
High cost of finance Bad international finance
Bad local finance Low domestic saving
Poor intermediation
Source: Rodrik (2007), Figure 2.1, p. 66. The table classifies potential constraints on private investment and entrepre­
neurship. 'Social' returns here refer to economy-wide returns; i.e., impacts on GDP. The references to 'low returns' and 
'low appropriability' refer to low private returns and low ability of private agents to appropriate the social returns to their 
own activity.
that even after taking into account second-best interactions and indirect effects, 
the net impact of a policy change is beneficial (and hopefully sizeable).
[Rodrik 2007, p. 64, italics in original®]
Notice that in contrast to the neoclassical model the level of income does 
not appear directly in the Hausmann et al. (2005) growth equation. The 
reason for this is that the underlying production function has an endogenous 
growth structure with constant returns to capital (an 'AK' modeF). Low 
income can nonetheless affect growth indirectly, as we have been emphasiz­
ing, via the vector of fundamentals z = [a, a, 8, v, r, p]; or, equivalently, via the 
ten channels identified in Table 3.1. Thus while poverty plays no explicit role 
in the Hausmann et al. analysis, it can in principle act as a binding constraint 
on growth, by activating other constraints. Examples might include credit 
market failures that mle out collateral-free borrowing (poor intermediation); a 
low opportunity cost of violence leading to a high risk of armed conflict 
(insecure property rights); a low fiscal capability to address constraints of 
geography and infrastructure (low social returns); and predatory taxation of 
capital in order to redistribute resources to a poor majority (micro risks). We 
discuss some of these further in section 3.
The growth diagnostics framework makes an important distinction between 
growth constraints associated with high social returns to investment and 
constraints associated with low social returns ('social' here simply means
® See Rodrik's web page for links to country studies that use the growth diagnostics approach to 
identify binding constraints.
^ The per-worker production function is y = r-k, so r corresponds to A in the production function 
Y = A-K.
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'economy-wide'; the concept refers to impacts on discounted aggregate out­
put). The former category implies some combination of market and/or gov­
ernment failures, and therefore has the enticing feature of potentially 
invalidating the classical trade-off between equity and efficiency. Hoff and 
Stiglitz (2001) and Banerjee and Duflo (2005) argue that the absence of this 
trade-off is an empirically important feature of the economic environment in 
low-income countries. The argument these authors are making is two-fold: 
first, that resources are allocated inefficiently because of incomplete markets 
and/or misguided policies, and second, that these inefficiencies are biased 
against the poor (an argument prominently associated with the World Devel­
opment Report (World Bank, 2005)). We return to these themes shortly, in our 
discussion of microeconomic poverty traps. But two key points must follow 
immediately. First, when the equity/efficiency trade-off is absent, poverty- 
alleviation policies may acquire what Ray (1998) calls a functional justification: 
they improve overall economic performance. Growth strategies that miss this 
point may fail to produce growth. Second, however, the precise form of such 
policies is unclear. The binding constraints approach relies heavily on the 
principle of policy targeting, which states that effective interventions tend to 
be those that most closely target the sources rather than the symptoms of 
distortions (Rodrik, 2007, p. 90). Even in the presence of a microeconomic 
poverty trap, direct redistribution to the poor may or may not qualify, depend­
ing on the ancillary costs of such a policy and the returns to alternative 
reforms. China's agricultural reforms of the 1980s, for example, are generally 
regarded as having been massively progressive and growth promoting. But 
these focused more on changing production incentives at the margin than on 
redistributing existing resources (a distinction emphasized by Chenery et al., 
1974; see Qian, 2003 on China's reforms).
Some of the constraints that Hausmann et al. place in the second category, 
of reducing the social returns to investment in physical capital and entrepre­
neurship, are associated with low levels of human and/or public infrastructure 
capital. These forms of capital may themselves carry high social returns, in 
which case their scarcity again points to market and/or government failures 
that may invalidate the equity/efficiency trade-off. Credit market imperfec­
tions that prevent the poor from making high-yielding investments in human 
capital provide one example; the under-provision of productivity-enhancing 
public goods in poor areas provides another. But other constraints that keep 
social returns low can raise more difficult—and conventional—trade-offs. 
Geographical constraints, for example, may reduce the returns to a wide 
range of public and private investments, as argued by Faye et al. (2004) and 
Collier and O'Connell (2007) for landlocked and resource-poor countries in 
Africa. In such cases growth may in effect be prohibitively expensive, in the 
sense that for known technologies an investment programme capable of
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overcoming natural constraints reduces appropriately discounted consumption. 
In such cases the appropriate locus for redistribution would be primarily inter­
national rather than national. As is traditional in public economics, such 
intervention would appeal to intrinsic rather than functional justifications, 
drawing on inequality aversion, universal rights, or other ethical frameworks. 
It might also be motivated by cross-border externalities from low income, for 
example operating through conflict.
2.5 Empirical work on economy-wide development traps
Given our discussion, it should not be surprising that the growth literature 
remains indecisive about the empirical relevance of development traps. Cross­
country growth regressions do not tend to be directly informative. At issue is 
the shape of the phase diagram relating the level of income to its growth rate, 
perhaps conditional on some exogenous fundamentals—the relationship we 
have called f{y; x) above. The growth literature, instead, estimates structural 
models of the form g=f{y;z) where some or all of the z may be functions of y as 
well as of X.
Research on development traps per se has focused almost exclusively on 
whether conditions are such as to favour multiple equilibria. Support comes 
from Quah (1993; 1996), who studied the evolution over time of the empirical 
distribution of national incomes and documented the emergence of a bimodal 
(twin peaks) pattern comprising distinct and largely stable groups of high- and 
low-income countries. Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2003) also find that the 
data favour two groups over one; and they show that the level of steady-state 
income and the probability of exiting the low-income group depend on 
rainfall and other aspects of tropical geography. The latter variables play the 
role of deep fundamentals or ‘x’ variables in our terminology, suggesting the 
presence of a geographically based development trap. The mechanisms 
through which this trap operates, however, remain unclear.
Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996) find some evidence in cross-country data 
of threshold effects associated with financial development. Berthelemy (2007) 
studies country-by-country growth trajectories over time, looking for the 
'inverted U' configurations suggested by Figure 3.5. He argues that while 
institutional factors, investment rates, and demographic features were broadly 
similar between low-income countries that experienced take-offs after 1950 
and those that did not, the former group had achieved significantly higher 
rates of primary education before growth accelerated.
Elsewhere in the growth literature the empirical support for development 
traps has tended to be weaker. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) find that saving rates 
vary with aggregate income, but not in a manner capable of generating 
development traps. Easterly (2006) and Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian
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(2007) conclude that the saving rates of poor countries are not low enough to 
generate an accumulation-based trap. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) look for evi­
dence of inaeasing returns to capital that are strong enough in the aggregate to 
generate a trap; they fail to find such evidence, either in the developing- 
country literature or in their own cross-country estimates for Africa.
3 Microeconomic Poverty Traps
We have defined a development trap as a situation in which income increases 
can become self-perpetuating: dg/dy > 0 over some interval of y. A poverty trap, 
from this perspective, is a development trap that is activated when income is 
near or below some standard of absolute deprivation. This approach to pov­
erty traps accommodates cross-country heterogeneity in incomes, but it 
ignores the important role played by within-country inequality and poverty, 
both in the growth literature and in the formulation of country-level growth 
strategies. A transparent way to bring these considerations on board is to 
define an economy-wide poverty trap as a situation in which aggregate growth 
is constrained by the low incomes of the poor.
It is not obvious, of course, that accommodating intra-national inequality 
strengthens the theoretical case for economy-wide poverty traps. The classical 
economists, for example, viewed inequality as good for growth. Workers were 
consumers rather than savers, and comprised the bulk of the population; 
international financial markets were closed. Investment had to come from 
saving by the wealth-owning classes, and this meant that growth required a 
high income share for capitalists (see Galor and Moav, 2004).® But more recent 
theories deemphasize accumulation, as we have stressed, and feature a variety 
of mechanisms through which inequality can undermine productivity and 
^owth. The growth evidence, as well, points increasingly to negative impacts 
of inequality on growth (Btoabou, 1996).
For a given level of mean income or consumption, it turns out to be difficult 
to distinguish the growth impacts of within-country poverty from those of 
within-country inequality. The reason is that household survey data tend to 
produce distributions that are nearly lognormal, a distribution fully charac­
terized by the mean and standard deviation of log consumption. Poverty 
headcounts are therefore almost exact functions of these two parameters, 
implying that growth regressions that include a conditional convergence 
term and a measure of overall inequality will have difficulty distinguishing
® Lewis (1954) brought this tradition into development economics. like Ricardo, Lewis had 
to stmggle with the role of landowners, a wealth-owning class prone in the classical view to 
consumption rather than saving.
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the impact of the poverty headcount. This constraint may recede as better data 
make it possible to exploit modest deviations from log-normality. Ravallion 
(2012), for example, finds that poverty rates out-perform inequality in a cross­
country regression, suggesting that it is within-country poverty rather than 
inequality that matters for growth (see also Lopez and Serven, 2009). But 
Ravallion's finding does not survive the inclusion of country-level fixed 
effects, and therefore may be driven by unobserved correlates of country- 
level poverty.
Accommodating the emerging evidence on growth impacts from 
within-country poverty and inequality focuses attention on what we will 
call microeconomic poverty traps—situations in which low income may be 
self-perpetuating for households or local communities. To see why, suppose 
that households below and above the poverty line receive average per-capita 
incomes yp and y^ > yp respectively. The economy's growth rate is a 
weighted average of income growth within the two groups, so defining h 
as the poverty headcount ratio and A = h-yp/y as the share of the poor in 
overall national income, we have ^ = A-5> + (1 - A)-gN. The response of overall 
growth to a one-time change in the incomes of the poor is therefore 
dgidyp = A • dgpfdyp -t- (1 - A) • dgN/dy?
An economy-wide poverty trap holds, in our definition, if dg / dyp > 0 over 
some empirically relevant range of incomes of the poor. Microeconomic 
poverty traps {dgpidyp) are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
this to occur, because the final term can be of either sign and may be domin­
ant in practice. But as A rises, an overall trap becomes increasingly less plaus­
ible in the absence of mechanisms that make poverty self-perpetuating at the 
household level.® Table 3.2 estimates the consumption share of the poor in 
various regions, using the lowest poverty line ($1.25 a day) and drawing on 
consumption surveys conducted since 2000. At 25 per cent of GDP, the 
consumption share of the poor in SSA is double their share in the East Asia 
and Pacific region and three times their share in South Asia. A higher poverty 
line would of course scale this 25 per cent figure up further.
These observations suggest that research on microeconomic poverty traps 
may have an important role to play in improving the knowledge base for 
growth strategies in Africa. In the remainder of this section we briefly review
® Of course, it is also unlikely that low incomes among the poor could seriously constrain growth 
opportunities for the rich—so that dyp > 0—if poverty were a temporary phenomenon at the
household level. Thus Azam (2007), for example, argues that deprivation among the poor can 
increase the threat of armed rebellion, an argument that relies not just on low current income, but 
also on limited prospects for future income (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). But persistent poverty is 
not the same thing as self-perpetuating poverty—just as, in the neoclassical model, permanently 
adverse fundamentals ate consistent with conditional convergence, not with development traps.
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Table 3.2. Headcount ratios, Gini coefficients, and consumption shares of the poor
Region number 
of surveys
Regional averages
Headcount 
ratio, h (%)
Gini coefficient, C Approximate consumption 
share of the poor,0 (%)
SSA 38 50 44 25
lAC 2 0 47 0
SASIA 3 21 40 8
EAR 7 29 39 13
MENAT 7 4 39 1
ECA 23 6 33 2
Source. Worid Bank, PovcalNet online database. The headcount and Gini are calculated from the latest available 
consumption survey data for 2000 or later, and using $1.25 (PPP) a day as the poverty line. We have calculated 
the approximate consumption shares of the poor for each country as follows: if the poverty headcount is 43%, the 
approximate consumption share of the poor is the sum of the shares of the lowest 4 consumption deciles plus 3/10 of the 
share of the 5th decile. This will be slightly upwardly biased due to inequality of incomes within deciles.
the relevant theory, in light of our earlier discussion. Section 4 then looks at 
approaches to assessing the empirical relevance of microeconomic traps.
3.1 Microeconomic trap mechanisms
To set the stage for our discussion of microeconomic traps, consider three 
caricatures of how microeconomic heterogeneity might be accommodated 
within a one-sector growth analysis. The first assumes complete and competi­
tive markets in general equilibrium: its close relationship to the neoclassical 
growth paradigm will be apparent. The second captures a market failure that 
undermines aggregate efficiency and is biased against the poor: borrowing 
requires collateral, and the poor have no collateral. The third creates ineffi­
ciency through a political distortion: the rich dominate political institutions 
and use their power to prevent the poor from setting up firms as entrepreneurs.
In each case we follow the lead of Banerjee and Duflo (2005) and focus on 
how capital markets allocate available resources among heterogeneous uses. 
To introduce heterogeneity we assume that individuals are endowed with 
projects of limited size that only they can implement. These projects use 
capital to produce a homogeneous output, and their productivity varies across 
individuals. For simplicity we impose diminishing returns at the individual 
level by assuming that each project can use up to 1 unit of capital (with 
constant returns), after which the marginal return goes to zero. This extreme 
version of diminishing returns is not necessary for our argument provided that 
each project has an upper limit of the amount of capital it can employ 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). Again for simplicity, we assume that there are 
no imperfections in goods or labour markets.
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COMPLETE AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Suppose that capital markets work perfectly. At a point like 3 in Figure 3.6, the 
country's very small capital stock would flow into the hands of the small 
proportion of the population possessing the highest-productivity projects. 
These entrepreneurs would earn rents on their superior skills or ideas; other 
households would be workers. Households lacking productive labour or high- 
yielding investment projects could end up severely disadvantaged, but the 
initial distribution of capital across households would be irrelevant to the set 
of projects implemented, and any household capable of saving would receive 
a return equal to the (high) economy-wide marginal return to capital. If there 
were diminishing returns at the microeconomic level, moreover, this would 
provide some impetus for convergence of incomes across households: other 
things equal, for example, households with low initial education would have 
an easier time borrowing to finance education than households with initially 
higher attainment. The standard trade-off between equity and efficiency 
would prevail; redistributive policies would be costly in terms of efficiency 
but potentially justifiable on ethical grounds. Poverty traps would be absent, 
whether economy-wide or at the microeconomic level.
As noted by Banerjee and Duflo (2005), an aggregate production function 
with diminishing returns exists in this economy, despite the heterogeneity of 
projects at the microeconomic level. Moreover, in this economy capital mar­
kets achieve dynamic efficiency in the sense of maximizing the economy's 
end-of-period capital stock over any finite horizon, subject to the sequence of 
aggregate consumption up to that period (Burmeister, 1980).
REGRESSIVE MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
Suppose instead that imperfections of information and enforcement induce 
lenders to use wealth as collateral. Access to credit is now severely restricted for 
poor households, and capital markets fail to equalize the returns to capital 
across projects. The average marginal product of capital across poor house­
holds is higher than the average marginal product for the non-poor, because 
the poor have (some) high-yielding projects that are going unexploited while 
the non-poor are investing to the point of low marginal returns.
In this setting there is no well-behaved aggregate production function 
mnning through point 4 in Figure 3.6, and the one-sector growth model 
may fail even as a first-order approximation (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). We 
know that dynamic efficiency fails, but we cannot analyse the development 
process without knowing more about how resources are actually allocated in 
the economy. Elegant models have been developed to this end by Galor and 
Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996), and Aghion and Bolton (1997). In these models 
the level and growth of aggregate output depends on the distribution of 
income and wealth (see also World Bank, 2005). These models often
70
Is Poverty a Binding Constraint on Growth
emphasize inequality rather than poverty per se, but they generate poverty 
traps when the relevant market failures are triggered by low absolute income 
or wealth, as in models of collateral-based lending.
POLITICALLY GENERATED DISTORTIONS
I
Now suppose that information and enforcement problems are absent but that 
political power is monopolized by a wealthy elite that is determined to 
exclude a poor majority from access to resources and political power 
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Adam and O'Connell, 1999). Institutions are 
built over time to reflect the interests of the elite; these institutions influence 
the size and nature of public expenditures (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1994) and, in our example, prevent the non-elite from operat­
ing as entrepreneurs rather than workers.
To take the most extreme case, suppose that the economy's capital is 
allocated lexicographically: first to any member of the elite group willing to 
borrow, and only next, if an excess supply of capital remains at the economy­
wide level, to members of the non-elite. Within the two groups, for simplicity, 
capital is allocated efficiently, so as to equalize marginal products across 
projects. Figures.? shows an example in which the elite comprise one-third 
of the population and the productivity of projects is drawn randomly from the
Figure 3.7. Regressive political distortions
Notes: The upper dashed curve shows an aggregate production function along which all feasible 
projects are ordered from most to least productive. The straight line is the output required to 
generate saving sufficient to just replace the existing capital stock, as in the Solow model. If all 
feasible projects are implemented the total required capital is 42. All individuals draw a project 
randomly from the overall distribution of returns. The political elite comprise one-third of the 
population, and their projects ate implemented (on an efficient basis within the elite, the most 
productive first) before any project of the non-elite is implemented. At the kink, where k = 14 (= 42/3), 
the elite have mn out of projects to implement. Any additional capital is allocated efficiently 
among projects of the non-elite. In the configuration shown, there are two locally stable equilibria 
with a threshold of about k = 16.
71
Jean-Yves Duclos and Stephen A. O'Connell
same distribution for each group. The aggregate production function has a 
sharp nonconvexity at a capital stock sufficient to finance all of the projects of 
the elite. If we model saving and population growth as in the Solow model, an 
economy-wide development trap emerges. Unless the aggregate capital stock 
is well clear of a threshold (in Figure 3.7, at a capital stock of roughly 16), 
income stays low for an extended period.
This development trap implies a poverty trap in our narrower sense if it is 
perpetuated by the low incomes of the non-elite. Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997) argue that in highly unequal Latin American societies, low levels of 
income and education have worked to prevent the non-elite from mounting 
effective legal or institutional counter-attacks against regressive policies.
From a standard public finance perspective, of course, redistribution does 
not have to be regressive to undermine growth, or to generate a link from 
poverty to growth. Some prominent alternative theories argue that poverty 
imdermines the investment environment for the wealthy. In an unequal but 
otherwise well-functioning democracy, for example, the median voter holds 
little capital and may therefore support a growth-reducing platform of high 
capital taxation and aggressive redistribution (Benabou, 1996). In a similar 
vein but focusing on armed conflict, Azam (2007) and Bates (2007) develop 
theories of civil war and rebel activity in which poverty undermines invest­
ment by the rich—and drives existing assets abroad—^by reducing the oppor­
tunity cost of violence among the non-elite. Theories of crime may operate 
similarly. These approaches differ sharply from our case at the microeconomic 
level, however: in our case social returns are higher among the poor than the 
rich, while in these theories the reverse is true.
3.2 Further mechanisms
The previous subsection illustrated two broadly plausible channels from pov­
erty to growth in Africa: one operating through the interaction of poverty and 
market imperfections and the other through the effect of poverty on political 
and economic institutions. We argued that these channels can help explain 
why entire economies may fail to develop, as well as suggesting specific 
mechanisms through which subgroups remain poor. Here we take a brief 
look at some additional mechanisms operating under these headings.
Additional growth-reducing interactions may occur between poverty and 
financial market imperfections, by requiring poor households to engage in
When markets are complete and competitive, any Intervention to redistribute resources 
produces a deadweight loss, unless the government has access to non-distortionary instruments 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). The equity/efficiency trade-off, from this perspective, is an 
implication of a more general 'redistribution/efflciency' trade-off.
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asset-building strategies that are difficult to sustain in the face of urgent 
consumption needs and insecure vehicles for saving. Thus if discrete, comple­
mentary or 'lumpy' investments in physical or human capital are needed to 
increase productivity above a minimum threshold, households unable either 
to borrow or to build assets sustainably may be stuck in a low-productivity 
state. The absence of credit and insurance markets may also leave house­
holds that are too poor to build asset buffers exposed to potentially cata­
strophic short-term declines in consumption. This exposure may in turn 
lead to inadequate investments in high-yielding but risky activities including 
education, fertility control, and the adoption of new seed varieties or agricul­
tural techniques (Dercon, 2002; 2005).
Another plausible example of a micro development trap is nutritional. 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986) assume that production requires a caloric intake 
that exceeds the body's resting requirement (the basic metabolic rate). Work 
effort is then subject to a threshold effect, whereby small increases in nutri­
tional intake, once basic requirements are met, generate disproportionate 
increases in productivity. Redistribution in favour of poor households that 
are unable to borrow can enhance both equity and economy-wide productiv­
ity (Dasgupta and Ray, 1987).
Carter and Barrett (2006) emphasize an analogy between household-level 
income dynamics and our development trap analysis in the presence of 
market imperfections. In this setting, households may have characteristics 
(skills and/or preferences) that tie down their ultimate equilibrium welfare 
level, but the path to this equilibrium displays nonlinearities and varying 
returns to scale that give rise to the same kind of state-dependence we empha­
sized with our non-monotonic phase diagrams. Similar interactions can in 
principle arise through neighbourhood effects involving corruption and other 
conformity and peer-group influences, through self-reinforcing individual 
and social beliefs, or through coordination failures and externalities 
(Mookherjee and Ray, 2001; Mookherjee, 2006).
Sachs et al. (2004) and others argue that sub-Saharan Africa's geographic 
and economic features favour microeconomic development traps. Features 
like high transportation costs, small market sizes, and a high disease burden 
(Bloom et al., 2003) can generate local or regional poverty traps if the com­
munities they affect are too poor to generate sufficiently large-scale invest­
ments to overcome them.
" Deaton (1992) emphasizes the role of impatience in limiting precautionary saving by 
households shut out from credit markets. Mullinaithan and Shaflr (2013) argue that excessive 
impatience and limited self-control may In part be behavioural offshoots of living with a chronic 
scarcity of resources.
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As a final observation we note that trap-like mechanisms can readily interact 
at a sectorial or general-equilibrium level. As in big-push theories of develop­
ment, complementarities may exist between the inputs needed to foster 
development, including for example road infrastmcture, electricity, and an 
educated labour force. Increasing capital in any one of these dimensions 
might produce little effect in the absence of investment in the others. 
Mwabu and Thorbecke (2004) argue that market failures and institutional 
failures may reinforce each other in rural areas of Africa. Thus, difficulties in 
enforcing contracts and poorly functioning financial, land, and labour mar­
kets may interact to encourage subsistence activities, illiquid investments, and 
growth-reducing behaviour. These micro traps may then be compounded by 
problems of insecurity, poor levels of public goods and services, dispropor­
tionate taxation of agricultural output, and poor infrastructure; arguably 
caused by institutions that do not take sufficiently into account the interests 
of rural dwellers.
4 Microeconomic Poverty Traps: Evidence
There are serious empirical difficulties in establishing the existence and nature 
of microeonomic poverty traps. The productivity impact of better health and 
education, for example, may be subject to long delays. Individual and 
community-level investment may be complementary to macro investments 
in larger-scale infrastructure and social services, and these economy-wide 
variables may be difficult to control adequately in environments where they 
change very little. Finally, empirical work on microeconomic development 
traps will typically have to handle endogeneity of the behavioural variables of 
interest, as well as unobserved heterogeneity in the determinants of output 
and productivity. Fertility-based traps, for example, rely on the joint deter­
mination of income and fertility behaviour. Spatial poverty traps may be 
correlated with locational variables, to take another example, but if there are 
unobserved variables that determine both location and income, it would be 
misleading to interpret location effects in an income regression as evidence of 
poverty traps. Despite these caveats, however, there are several ways in which 
the existence of microeconomic development traps can be suggested. By direct 
analogy with the economy-wide case, these are situations in which the 
expected growth rate of income for poor households is not merely low in 
absolute terms, but lower than it is at higher income levels, although such 
households may not face an outright poverty trap. We briefly describe a few 
of them and provide suggestive evidence that these can matter particularly 
in Africa.
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4.1 Poverty and inequality in Africa
By absolute standards, income poverty in Africa is both widespread and 
greater than in any other region of the world. Unlike in most other 
developing-country regions, it has also failed to decrease significantly in 
recent decades. Table 3.3 shows that the proportion of individuals living 
below 1.25 dollars per day has fallen considerably over the last three decades 
in Asia and in the Pacific. In sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion has finally 
begun to fall after rising through the mid 1990s. Table 3.4 shows that Africa 
will probably soon contain the largest absolute number of poor people on 
earth, larger than in East Asia or in South Asia, where absolute population sizes 
are larger. Table 3.4 also shows that the total number of the poor in developing 
countries fell by nearly 950 million between 1981 and 2011; in Africa, it 
increased by over 200 million. This suggests that Africa is lagging not only 
in relative but also in absolute terms.
In section 3 we characterized a poverty trap as a situation in which df/dyp > 
0, i.e., in which higher incomes for the poor mean faster overall growth. In 
such a situation, a process of distribution-neutral growth—in which all
Table 3.3. Percentages of the developing-country population living 
below $1.25 a day, by region, 1981 -2011
Regions 1981 1996 2011
East Asia and Pacific 78.0 38.3 7.9
Europe and Central Asia 2.9 4.3 0.5
Latin America and Caribbean 11.7 10.6 4.6
Middle East and North Africa 8.9 4.8 1.7
South Asia 61.4 48.6 24.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 52.8 59.8 46.9
All developing countries 52.7 35.9 17.0
Source. World Bank, PovcalNet online database.
Table 3.4. Numbers of people (in millions) living below $1.25 a day, by 
developing-country region, 1981 -2011
Regions 1981 1996 2011
East Asia and Pacific 1,107.5 681.9 160.8
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 12.6 20.1 2.4
Latin America and Caribbean 42.5 51.1 27.6
Middle East and North Africa 15.3 12.3 5.6
South Asia 570.3 630.0 399.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 210.4 359.2 415.8
Total 1,958.3 1,754.4 1,011.4
Source. World Bank, PovcalNet online database.
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incomes rise at roughly equal rates, so that measures of inequality remain 
unchanged—tends to be self-reinforcing, through its impact on the incomes 
of the poor. In the growth model of Galor and Moav (2004), for example, low 
levels of economy-wide human capital form a binding constraint on invest­
ment in physical capital. The scarcity of human capital, in turn, is concen­
trated among the poor, who cannot bonow to finance their children's 
education. Inequality is bad for growth in the sense that for a given average 
income, greater inequality generates a lower level of human capital invest­
ment. But any general improvement in living standards—even one accom­
panied by a mild increase in inequality—reduces the share of the population 
with incomes low enough to activate the credit market constraint. Ultimately 
it is poverty, rather than inequality, that constrains growth in this model.
We suggested in section 3.1 that it may be inequality rather than poverty 
per se that constrains growth, for example by sustaining political institutions 
that impair long-term development (World Bank, 2005). 'Inequality' here can 
of course refer as much to inequality of opportunity (e.g., access to markets 
and public services) as to inequality of earnings or consumption. But 
distribution-neutral growth is unlikely to overcome constraints that are 
grounded in either type of inequality. Such concerns are potentially relevant 
for Africa, where inequality is high by comparison with other regions (and 
comparable to Latin America; see Table 3.2). Within Africa, of course, their 
relevance may vary considerably (Figure 3.8): inequality in parts of southern 
Africa is among the highest in the world, while Mauritius has low inequality 
even by the standards of OECD countries.
4.2 Correlates of poverty in Africa
The poor in Africa are heterogeneous in nature and can be found in all social 
classes. But there are characteristics that tend to be systematically correlated 
with poverty both across countries and over time. The nature of these char­
acteristics is suggestive of the factors that can induce development traps.
Household poverty is positively correlated with household size, the absence 
of adults of working age, and the presence of children and elderly people. 
These are stmctural socio-demographic characteristics that evolve slowly 
and can be difficult to change by one's own will. Family formation, fertility 
decisions, and productive arrangements are examples of factors that affect 
stmctural demographic characteristics and that depend on what can be long- 
lasting cultural norms. These characteristics naturally tend to perpetuate 
themselves across generations. They are also subject to neighbourhood effects.
The poor usually lack physical and financial assets as well as income. Pov­
erty is also highly correlated with being landless. When the poor do own land.
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Figure 3.8. Within-country inequality 
Source: World Bank (2005).
that land is often relatively unproductive, difficult to access, and/or difficult to 
irrigate. It is also difficult to improve and exchange in formal land markets.
Subsistence agriculture is nevertheless the main source of income for many 
of the poor in Africa. Agricultural output also tends to be one of the most 
volatile sources of income and one in which it is the most difficult to invest in 
economies with weakly functioning credit and land markets. Again, this may 
be difficult to change if the factors involved extend well beyond the reach of 
individuals.
The poor also have a relatively low level of human capital and educational 
achievement. Poverty is further strongly associated with occupational and 
employment status. For instance, in South Africa, of the 18 million below a 
semi-official poverty line in 2004, 14 million lived in workerless households; 
most of these households contained working-age but unemployed people 
(Meth 2007). Hence, in addition to having lower levels of human capital 
and skills, the poor are often unable to sell their labour in a reasonably free 
and competitive labour market.
The poor frequently suffer from hunger, malnutrition, and illness. Non­
monetary measures of well-being therefore tend to be worse for the income- 
poor, as reflected in such indicators such as child mortality rates, stunting.
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wasting, and the incidence of illness. Moreover, access to health care is typic­
ally more difficult for the poor. This hostile health environment can further 
deteriorate the productive value of their human capital. Undemutrition has 
indeed been found to lower productivity (Strauss, 1986; Deolalikar, 1988), 
while malnutrition in children tends to decrease their learning and future 
productivity (e.g., Glewwe et al., 2001). All of this suggests that inequality in 
income and in nutrition may decrease total productivity (and its growth).
Poverty tends to be associated with membership in ethnic minorities and 
particular racial groups. These groups tend to face higher income poverty and 
greater deprivation of schooling and health achievements and to benefit less 
from infrastructure investment and other types of public goods and services. 
Poverty is also associated with weak participation in social and political pro­
cesses, and is sometimes reflected in exploitative relationships that can again 
deny the poor access to markets and to public and private goods and services.
4.3 Spatial development traps
Household-level studies systematically find that the characteristics of the 
region of residence are correlated with living standards and poverty, even 
after controlling for other household characteristics. Although there are sev­
eral ways in which location can influence poverty through purely geographic 
effects, the association between geography and infrastructure, access to public 
services, and market quality is also usually very strong. Poorer areas are often 
geographically distant from formal input and output markets. Such distance 
implies limited work opportunities or exclusion from areas and enclaves in 
which growth is concentrated. Markets that are geographically close to poor 
areas, in turn, tend to be relatively less developed. Non-farm employment, for 
instance, can be scarce and seasonal. Poorer areas also tend to have lower access 
to public services, such as education and health. Ayadi et al. (2005) argue that 
in Tunisia rural roads have played an important role in helping the rural poor 
connect to urban markets and services, and that this has improved their living 
conditions. Although no estimates of the returns to this infrastmcture are 
presented, such estimates could be implicitly taken as evidence for the exist­
ence of development traps, especially if they differ significantly across areas.
A disproportionate number of the poor are also located in areas where arable 
land is scarce or is of relatively bad quality, or where droughts, floods, and other 
environmental shocks generate relatively high levels of community-level risk. 
This generates lower agricultural productivity and/or greater vulnerability. Both 
of these tend to decrease investment in physical (and often in human) capital.
Whether spatial externalities create a development trap is certainly of inter­
est. This would be the case for instance if living in a poor area meant a lower 
return on one's investment, and if one could not invest elsewhere because of
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imperfect capital markets. The evidence for such effects, however, is easily 
confounded by correlations between location and unobserved household 
characteristics. Panel data can be useful in such a context. With such data 
for rural China, Jalan and Ravallion (2002) find that location-specific capital 
has geographically divergent impacts on household consumption growth, 
after controlling for both observed and unobserved household characteristics. 
They argue that since poorer areas have access to lower levels of productivity­
enhancing public goods like transportation infrastmcture, households in 
those areas are hampered by lower productivity on their human and capital 
investments. This discourages them from making such investments and thus 
makes them subject to a spatial development trap.
4.4 Correlates of chronic and temporary poverty
Evidence suggestive of the existence of development traps can also be 
obtained by examining patterns in the distribution of chronic and transient 
poverty. The idea here is that the correlates of chronic poverty, or those that 
reduce the likelihood of exiting poverty, may be associated with the presence 
of development traps.
As in the case of poverty at a point in time, the distribution of chronic and 
transitory spells of poverty is strongly correlated both with location and with 
household characteristics (Okidi and McKay, 2003). The characteristics that 
matter differ somewhat across space, but some—such as asset holdings—often 
play a consistently key role. Exits out of and entries into poverty are usually 
explained by demographic and employment changes. This suggests that 
structural household shifts, such as household composition changes (death 
of a household member, dissolution, marriage, migration) or shifts in envir­
onmental parameters (e.g., an increased incidence of involuntary unemploy­
ment in the local area) can cause important changes in well-being (Woolard 
and Klasen, 2005).
Some household characteristics, such as household size, educational levels, 
unskilled labour power, and low levels of asset holding, also tend to influence 
the probability of moving into and out of poverty, regardless of initial poverty 
status (Bokosi, 2007; Barrett et al., 2006).
The determinants of chronic poverty and vulnerability are often similar. 
One reason for this might be that the characteristics that increase vulnerabil­
ity to a spell of poverty also impede the household's ability to exit such a spell. 
The chronically poor are indeed often found in less secure environments, and 
are those whose assets are too low to cope adequately with shocks. As we have 
emphasized, coping strategies may involve sacrificing long-term investments 
in order to address shorter-term needs.
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4.5 Imperfect markets and subsistence traps
Market failures are pervasive in low-income countries and in some cases even 
the rudimentary institutional underpinnings of market activity are absent 
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001). Banerjee and Duflo (2005) cite extensive evidence 
that the returns on capital are not equalized across firms or households. Hsieh 
and Klenow (2008) compare marginal products of capital at the factory level 
and show that if the capital stock were allocated as efficiently within narrowly 
defined industries in China and India as it is in the USA, TFP would be 30-50 
per cent higher in China and 40-60 per cent higher in India. As noted earlier, 
Banerjee and Duflo (2005) take this argument further by citing evidence that 
market failures affect poor households disproportionately (see also World 
Bank, 2005).
One observation potentially consistent with imperfect-market traps is that 
farm yields (output per acre) in poor countries tend to be lower the larger 
the landholding (Binswanger et al., 1995). A possible explanation is the 
existence of factor and credit market failures that hinder the reallocation of 
land sizes. If this were the case, then redistributing land from large land­
holders to smaller ones would raise total output. The existence of credit 
market failures also leads individual incomes to be an increasing concave 
function of their past value, implying that an equalizing redistribution 
would raise average income (Ravallion, 2004). Evidence of this is reported 
in Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) for Russia, and in Jalan and Ravallion 
(2001) for mral China.
4.6 Gender- and power-based traps
The existence of gender-associated differences in well-being and poverty is 
also suggestive of development traps, this time generated within the house­
hold. These traps can exist for the same reason that development traps may 
exist at the household and macroeconomic levels: due to market imperfec­
tions and/or to power-protecting institutions that sustain growth-reducing 
and discriminatory environments.
An increasingly important strand of the microeconomic literature examines 
the intra-household allocation of resources. This is difficult to study because 
many indicators of well-being are reliably observable only at the household 
level. One of the systematic correlates of individual well-being, however- 
based on indicators such as educational achievements or health status—is 
gender. Women and girls indeed tend to have lower educational achieve­
ments in Africa. They are also often more vulnerable to health shocks, includ­
ing those associated with pregnancy and birth-giving. They also tend to wield 
less power in family and community-level decision-making.
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Power differentials that that sustain and are sustained by economic inequal­
ity may also operate powerfully against the poor, and in ways that may or may 
not be mediated through gender. Bates (1981) argued that a policy bias against 
agriculture in Africa reflected the ease with which urban and rural elites could 
disarm collective action in poor mral communities. The incentives for power 
capture may also interact with and sustain any pre-existing ethno-social 
polarization of communities. Power and inequality dynamics may reach 
down to a very local level, particularly where mobility is limited: Galasso 
and Ravallion (2005), for example, find that those villages in Bangladesh 
where the distribution of land is more unequal are also less good at targeting 
the poor, possibly because this is also where the poor are less influential in 
village decision-making.
4.7 Mobility and time dependency
State dependence arises when the household's probability of exiting its cur­
rent state depends not just on the household's characteristics, but also on its 
history of being in or out of poverty. In such cases, two households with 
identical characteristics may display different probabilities of entering or 
exiting poverty if they differ in their distributions of previous poverty status. 
There is some evidence of state dependence in poverty dynamics, and a 
suggestion that this may be stronger in certain environments (such as in 
urban areas; Islam and Shimeles, 2007). State dependence is difficult to infer 
formally, however, since the household's initial poverty status may be correl­
ated with its unobserved characteristics.
Woolard and Klasen (2005) find that most of the income mobility observed 
in South Africa is related to demographic and employment changes. They 
view this as evidence in favour of four types of development trap, associated in 
turn with large initial household size, poor initial education, poor initial asset 
endowment, and poor initial employment. Care must be taken here, because 
demographic and employment variables are subject to household choice and 
may therefore be endogenous to levels and future expected changes in living 
standards. But some of the demographic or employment changes may indeed 
be determined by purely exogenous external shocks (such as deaths, or 
changes in employment in an environment of high involuntary unemploy­
ment such as exists in South Africa) that are difficult to reverse by the mere will 
of households. In this case, the fact that changes in characteristics are correl­
ated with subsequent poverty dynamics can indeed be taken as suggestive 
evidence of household-level development traps.
A related approach assesses the extent of intergenerational mobility as well 
as indicators of inequality of opportunity. Cogneau et al. (2006), for example, 
find that two countries with relatively low cross-sectional income inequality.
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Ghana and Uganda, also display relatively high intergenerational mobility 
and low inequality of opportunity (estimated by comparing the achievements 
of individuals conditional on the social origins and characteristics of parents). 
This can be done without panel data, so long as information on more than one 
generation is available. As always the implications in terms of the existence of 
development traps must be treated with care because of possible problems of 
correlation of unobserved characteristics across generations.
4.8 Asset traps
An interesting approach to testing for development traps uses dynamic 
household-level data on consumption and assets. The approach considers 
the evolution of assets in comparison to the assets expected to be needed to 
exit poverty. Mobility in living standards may be of little use if periods of 
relative prosperity are not used to accumulate assets. A failure to accumulate 
assets during good times may indeed mean that a household will eventually be 
pushed back to subsistence levels when worse times come. An important issue 
is therefore whether chronically poor households use temporary exits from 
poverty to move onto a trajectory of asset accumulation, in such a way that 
they would at some point exit the risk of chronic poverty.
One procedure that has been used to investigate this is to compute the 
consumption value that assets provide, and to estimate the asset stock 
required to support consumption above a poverty threshold. Assets vary in 
size and in nature, and it is therefore important to incorporate both the 
quality and the quantity of the assets households employ to generate con­
sumption. Adato et al. (2006), for example, use three types of asset to build an 
asset index for South African households: human capital (education), natural 
and productive capital (such as land, livestock, and equipment), and 
uneamed/transfer income. To allow for development-trap dynamics, Adato 
et al. hypothesize that temporary shocks to income and consumption can 
have permanents effects on living standards. To see this, it is useful to consider 
Figure 3.9, drawn from their paper. This shows the asset index at some later 
period, A(At)—^written as a function of the vector At of individual assets—as a 
function of its value in some earlier period, A(Ao). A 45-degree line shows 
when initial and later assets are equal. The solid line shows one possible 
configuration of the dynamics. In this case, a household that starts with assets 
between A{Ap) and /l(Am) will decumulate assets over time, ending with an 
asset index in period t that is below the initial level. Given the shape of the 
A(Ai) line, ^(A*) is a locally stable development-trap equilibrium. The house­
hold can only escape this trap by experiencing a large enough jump in assets 
to place it above the 'Micawber threshold' A{A„^. Above this threshold, assets 
converge to A{A*). Note that even if the assets of a household are above A(Am)
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Figure 3.9. Asset dynamics with a Micawber threshold 
Source: Adato et al. (2006).
for some time, a shock that pushes assets below A{Am) will force the household 
towards the low-level trap at A(Ap). The dashed curve in Figure 3.9 shows an 
alternative configuration that implies a unique equilibrium with convergent 
dynamics.
Figure 3.10 shows the shape of South African asset dynamics between 1993 
and 1998, as estimated from survey data by Adato et al. (2006). Taking into 
account the confidence bands, there does seem to be evidence of a Micawber 
threshold at an asset index of roughly twice the poverty line. The range of 
vulnerability, moreover, is wide: a household with asset index of more than 
three times the poverty line could be pushed to a locally stable low-level 
equilibrium if an asset shock moved it below the Micawber threshold. The 
estimated pattern of asset dynamics would predict that such a household 
could experience a drop in expected longer-term assets from more than 
three times the poverty line to a lower equilibrium of less than the poverty 
line. This would imply a severe change in the living standards, both in the 
short and in the longer term.
Suggestive evidence of the existence of development traps can also be 
obtained by examining the correlates of the evolution of assets across time. 
Assets can be less volatile and easier to measure than consumption and 
income. The evolution of assets is usually linked to the educational level of 
the household head, the availability of employment, land ownership, family 
composition, and geographical isolation (Burke et al., 2007).
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1993 asset index, A93 (poverty line units)
------ expected asset dynamics
------ 95% confidence bands
Figure 3.10. Estimated asset dynamics in South Africa 
Source: Adato et al. (2006).
5 Conclusions
Is poverty a binding constraint on growth in sub-Saharan Africa? At the 
aggregate level, we have taken an indirect approach to this question, asking 
instead whether poverty is what activates one or more of the constraints on 
productivity that are widely viewed as potentially relevant in low-income 
countries. Our discussion in this chapter suggests the following set of 
observations.
• Low income has coexisted with slow growth for a large number of coun­
tries since 1960, most of them in sub-Saharan Africa. This is consistent 
with development traps but does not imply them.
• The theoretical literature suggests a wide range of mechanisms through 
which low income can be self-perpetuating. While the literature focuses 
primarily on extreme cases that generate thresholds and multiple equi­
libria, we favour a broader definition of development traps that relies on 
non-monotonicity of the phase diagram relating growth to income.
• More than one development trap mechanism may be operative in any 
country or time period. The growth evidence nonetheless broadly favours 
mechanisms that operate through measured productivity rather than 
through factor accumulation.
84
Is Poverty a Binding Constraint on Growth
• Questions about multiplicity, and even about non-monotonicity of the 
growth process as a function of income, are difficult to resolve economet- 
rically given the brief period and non-experimental nature of the aggre­
gate growth data.
• The growth literature suggests that inequality can undermine growth by 
widening the scope of market failures and/or generating resource conflicts 
between poor majorities and rich minorities.
• Microeconomic research suggests that market failures disproportionately 
penalize the poor. There is ample scope for country-level research to 
document this phenomenon and explore its links to household incomes 
and wealth.
We have argued that the most promising avenues for further research on 
development traps are at the microeconomic level. In particular, country- 
based research that assesses the empirical relevance of microeconomic links 
from poverty to productivity, in specific contexts, should help redress the 
present imbalance between theory and evidence and ultimately strengthen 
the basis for policy.
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